Unlike the Western powers that established their colonial empires overseas, Russia created its empire through expansion into adjacent territories. Beginning with its annexation of Kazan in 1552, the Tsarist empire expanded gradually, swallowing up lands it bordered until it extended eastward to Russian North America — now Alaska.

During the early Soviet era, Moscow retained most of the lands it had taken, often by force, as when it crushed independent Ukraine in 1921 and reoccupied the independent Baltic states in 1940.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II the USSR granted nominal independence to the Eastern European states that its forces had occupied during the war. It maintained a major military presence in all of them, however, effectively rendering them puppets.

Moreover, although the Soviets did not actually colonize overseas states, they entrenched themselves militarily in several overseas states — notably Cuba, Egypt, Syria, Somalia and Vietnam.

Vladimir Putin is making every effort to recreate this empire. His annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine mirror the Tsars’ ongoing seizure of contiguous territories. Yet Putin has also followed in the footsteps of the Soviet Union by reaching beyond its own neighbors.

To begin with, Russia has supported the puppet states of Transnistria — which broke away from Moldova — as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both parts of Georgia. In addition, Russia dominates Belarus; its president Aleksandr Lukashenko often behaves as little more than a Russian provincial governor.

Russia has also made every effort to influence elections in former Warsaw Pact states to ensure that they have governments that support its interests.

And mirroring the Soviet past, Putin has sought to maintain Russian military presence overseas. Although Egypt expelled the Soviets in 1972, and the U.S. dislodged Putin ally president Nicolas Maduro from Venezuela earlier this year, Cuba remains close to Russia. So does Vietnam, even if its relations with Moscow are not as warm as they were during the Cold War.

Similarly, although Russia does not have the same degree of influence in Syria as it did during the rule of the Assads, it has retained its long-term leases on the Khmeimim air base near Latakia and the Tartus naval base.

Russia also continues to maintain a major presence in the formerly Francophone parts of sub-Saharan Africa through what was once the Wagner Group and is now called “Africa Corps.” The renaming reflects a change in control. Whereas the Wagner Group mercenaries were only loosely tied to the Kremlin, the Defense Ministry, and specifically Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov controls the Africa Corps.

It is through the Africa Corps that Russia has propped up the regime of Assimi Goita in Mali, as well as the governments of Niger and Burkina Faso, effectively replacing western presence in those Sahel countries.

Last week, however, Russia’s grip on the region suffered a major blow when the Azawad Liberation Front — an ethnic militia seeking the independence of northern Mali — forced Africa Corps units out of the northern city of Kidal. Africa Corps forces also appeared to be withdrawing from much of northern Mali — perhaps from as much from half its territory. And the jihadist Jamat Nasr al-Islam tak Musulmin were not only fighting government forces in the capital city of Bamako but also killed Malian Defense Minister Sadio Camara.

Despite these losses, and the likelihood that the successful rebel attacks could bolster ongoing rebellions by similar groups in pro-Russian Niger and Burkina Faso, Moscow does not appear capable of reinforcing the Africa Corps in order to reimpose government control throughout Mali. With losses of at least 30,000 troops a month, the war in Ukraine is draining Russia’s forces; Moscow has little to spare for its African adventures.

Washington might be tempted to exploit Russia’s vulnerability to further losses in the Sahel civil wars. Yet it should be wary of aligning itself with these rebels; they are no more pro-western than the governments they are fighting. Instead, the Trump administration should concentrate on supporting the Ukrainians.

The more Kyiv weakens Russia’s military, the less Moscow can sustain its African operations. At some point, should Russia depart from the Sahel, the U.S. may find a new opening in the region — but not by aligning with the governments that Russia sustained or the jihadists that oppose them. America’s unhappy experience in Afghanistan should serve as a warning: replacing one bad regime with another never works out as Washington intended.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.

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